The conflict mitigating effects of trade in the India-Pakistan case by Mamoon, D. (Dawood) & Murshed, S.M. (Syed)
Econ Gov (2010) 11:145–167
DOI 10.1007/s10101-010-0074-y
ORIGINAL PAPER
The conflict mitigating effects of trade
in the India-Pakistan case
Dawood Mamoon · S. Mansoob Murshed
Received: 5 May 2008 / Accepted: 19 October 2009 / Published online: 7 March 2010
© The Author(s) 2010. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract We examine whether greater inter-state trade, democracy and reduced
military spending lower belligerence between India and Pakistan, beginning with a
theoretical model covering the opportunity costs of conflict in terms of trade losses
and security spending, as well as the costs of making concessions to rivals. Conflict
between the two nations is best understood in a multivariate framework where vari-
ables such as economic performance, integration with rest of the world, bilateral trade,
military expenditure, democracy orientation and population are simultaneously con-
sidered. Our empirical investigation based on time series econometrics from 1950 to
2005 suggests that reduced bilateral trade, greater military expenditure, less develop-
ment expenditure, lower levels of democracy, lower growth rates and less general trade
openness are all conflict enhancing. Globalization, or a greater openness to interna-
tional trade with the rest of the world, is the most significant driver of a liberal peace,
rather than a common democratic orientation.
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1 Introduction
This paper examines inter-state hostility between India and Pakistan, which is argu-
ably one of the most prominent inter-state conflicts still extant, and whose saliency is
magnified by the presence of nuclear weapons. Conflict reduction is also necessary in
the region to release resources for poverty reduction. We analyse some of the factors
that might lead to conflict abatement between these long standing rivals, especially
the role of increased international trade as a conflict mitigating factor.
Outright war is just one manifestation of the rivalry between nations; the armed
peace is equally consistent with aggressiveness. India and Pakistan have had four large
scale military confrontations (1948, 1965, 1971 and 1999), but otherwise spend a great
deal of time in uncompromising posturing vis-à-vis each other. Central to their hostility
is the territorial dispute over Kashmir. India, in particular, frequently accuses Pakistan
of sponsoring terrorism in her territory. Negotiations are infrequent, but occasionally
both nations make goodwill gestures, such as sending out peace buses between cities,
and agree to cricket tours. Figure 1 (based on the data in Faten et al. 2004) charts the
hostility levels of the two states on a scale of 0–6. It has never been below 2, but is
usually at a high level of 4, which indicates belligerency short of outright war.
International trade allows one country to peacefully benefit from the endowment
of another nation through voluntary exchange. Conflict and rivalry are symptomatic
of the absence of cooperation, including lesser bilateral trade. Equally, conflict may
be said to be a consequence of the lack of trade. Polachek (1997) and Polachek and
Seiglie (2006) argue that wars and disputes between geographically contiguous states
involve substantial losses, as more efficient geographically proximate trade is dis-
placed. Figure 2 shows that India-Pakistan official trade (as a proportion of Pakistan’s
total international trade) steadily declined from nearly 20% in the early 1950s, plum-
meting to almost zero after their war in 1965, and has shown some signs of recovery
in the 1990s. But it is still below the levels of the 1950s, which was shortly after the
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Fig. 1 Hostility levels between India and Pakistan
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Fig. 2 Patterns in India–Pakistan trade
two nations separated. This is despite the fact that both India and Pakistan have fairly
open economies at present.
In the traditional realist international relations literature, nations co-exist in a
Hobbesian state of nature, where war is an opportunistic act actuated by self-interest,
and unrestrained by any social contract. Peace is maintained by a balance of power.
In contrast to this view are notions of the liberal peace; see Murshed (2010, chapter
7) for a review. The liberal peace may then be sub-divided into two strands: the first
among which is its idealist variant, sometimes referred to as the democratic peace. The
idea is that democracies will not fight each other because they share cultural norms
that militate against forceful dispute resolution, or alternatively the checks and bal-
ances that characterise political processes in advanced democracies restrain violence.
Put simply, the idea is that established democracies do not go to war with each other,
but cooperate instead. The intellectual basis for this argument is traced back to Imman-
uel Kant (1795) work on the Perpetual Peace, where a like mindedness referred to as
cosmopolitanism would prevent outright war between republics; a tendency that could
be reinforced by commercial interdependence.
The alternative notion of the liberal peace1 argues that it is against the economic
self-interest of nations to go to war with each other as it seriously disrupts mutually
beneficial international trade.2 The trouble with the pacific interpretation of interna-
tional trade is that during the two world wars of the 20th century, highly interdependent
economies went to total war with each other. While all analysts agree that war impedes
trade, the realist view is that countries may choose to disrupt their potential enemy’s
gains from trade by ceasing trade with them, even if this means hostilities. Even if
there are losses to the aggregate economy from war or diminished trade, some groups
may gain, and these groups may be the more politically influential. For example,
Kim and Rousseau (2005) find that conflict diminishes economic interdependence,
but not the other way around, providing only partial support for the opportunity cost
of trade liberal peace theory.
1 Theories of the liberal peace may be traced back to the Baron de Montesquieu’s, Spirit of the Laws (1748),
where he states that commerce tends to promote peace between nations; mutual self-interest precludes war;
trade also softens attitudes of peoples towards each other.
2 Sir Normal Angell, winner of the 1933 Nobel peace price and former editor of Foreign Affairs, in his
great book The Great Illusion, asserted that nations could never enrich themselves through war, and even a
victorious nation would come off economically worse from a war; see Angell-Lane (1910).
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Dorussen and Ward (2010) rehabilitate the role of trade in producing peace through
a novel channel. They argue that trade has important indirect effects over and above the
interdependence induced by bilateral trade. Increased trade generally, may do little to
mollify war-like tendencies between a pair of countries, but if each of these countries
interacts considerably with third countries, it will be not in their interests to go to war
with each other, as it disrupts other links and networks. In other words, any two coun-
tries are unlikely to go to war with each other if there trade with the rest of the world is
disrupted even when their bilateral trade dependence is low. Among other updates to the
liberal peace theory based on economic interdependence is the ‘capitalist’ peace notion
of Gartzke (2007), where the notion of interdependence is nuanced, and the saliency of
international trade in goods and services de-emphasized. The nature of advanced cap-
italism makes territorial disputes over resources less likely as the market mechanism
allows easier access to these. The nature of production makes the output of more sophis-
ticated goods and services increasingly reliant on ‘ideas’ that are research and develop-
ment intensive, and skilled personnel can be acquired through more open global labour
markets. Moreover, the disruption to integrated financial markets makes war less likely
between countries caught up in that web of interdependence. McDonald (2004) dem-
onstrates that it is not just the trade intensity between nations, but a commitment to
the policy of free trade, that may promote the liberal peace as it serves to dampen
domestic protectionist and pro-war interests, as will be demonstrated by our analysis.
In summary, the liberal peace ideas may rest upon a tripod (Gleditsch 2008)
with economic inter-dependence, democracy and common membership of interna-
tional organisations (the UN, NATO and the European union, for example) preventing
inter-state war. With regard to the relative contribution of democracy vis-à-vis trade,
Polachek (1997) presents empirical evidence suggesting that advanced democracies
cooperate, not because of their similar political systems, but due to their vast and
multiply intersecting economic interdependence.
Reverting back to the India-Pakistan example, we have noted that there bilateral
trade is very limited despite the fact that they are neighbours. What of their political
orientation? Here, too there is divergence. The Polity score gives us an average score
of democracy and autocracy ranging from 10 to −10, acting as an indicator of the
overall political system. India has always had one of the highest democracy scores in
the developing world (scoring 7–9), whereas Pakistan’s experience with democracy
fluctuates, with high autocracy scores associated with military coups in 1958, 1969,
1977 and 1999. Figure 3 indicates that military expenditures tend to move inversely
with development (education) expenditure, providing prima facie evidence that large
military expenditure crowds out development. In fact, these two countries have among
the highest military burdens in the world outside the Middle East (World Development
Indicators 2006).
The opportunity costs of conflict could rise when countries move to higher stages
of economic development as they have more to lose from conflict, and have more
resources to negotiate peaceful settlements. The 1990s is considered to be a golden
decade for India as GDP growth rates on average the Indian economy grew at
5–6% annually. Pakistan, too, has seen a growth spurt up to 2007. If anything, conflict
between the two nations can be best understood in a multivariate framework. We exam-
ine whether greater inter-state trade, democracy and reduced military spending lowers
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Fig. 3 Conflict, development and democracy trends in India–Pakistan
belligerence between India and Pakistan in a time series framework, between 1950
and 2005 in most cases. The rest of the paper is organised as follows: Sect. 2 contains
the theoretical model, the empirical analysis is presented in Sect. 3, where the relevant
variables and processes (economic performance, integration with rest of the world,
bilateral trade, military expenditure, democracy and population) are simultaneously
taken into account, finally Sect. 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical model
This section consists of two parts: the first deals with the costs of belligerent behaviour
in a single country context where the losses are displaced trade and the crowding out
effects of defence expenditure; the second looks at the costs of peaceful behaviour
where the disutility of making concessions to an adversary is modelled in a two coun-
try setting. The situations we model either pertain to limited warfare, with negligible
effects on national endowments, or alternatively we could be said to model the costs
of an armed peace associated with large security and military establishments. In many
ways, conflict has similar effects as other forms of trade wars.
2.1 Costs of war
We begin with a single country’s decision making with regard to belligerence, based
on Polachek (1997). The welfare of either country (U ) depends upon consumption
(E), and security (S), entering the utility function in a separable fashion:
U = u(E, S) (1)
Where:
E = cQ − X + M − T (2)
Q is the total endowment of the country where a proportion c is devoted to private
and public non-military consumption and investment; a fraction 1−c to a public good
covering security or military expenditure. X and M denote exports and imports to the
rival country, and T represents trade (exports minus imports) with the rest of the world.
θ is the price of the exportable and the price of the importable is the numeraire good,
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normalised at unity. There is also a balance of trade constraint; the value of exports
must equal imports:
θ X (S) − M + T = 0, . . . Xs < 0 (3)
Following Polachek (1997) let us postulate that conflict disrupts trade. Specifically, it
lowers exports, but unlike in Polachek’s model both countries are hostile towards each
other, and not just one country (described as the actor) against a passive target. So, in
our model, both countries exports to each other will decline, along with ambiguous
effects on the terms of trade. The country whose goods are demanded more elastically
will experience the negative terms of trade effect. Nevertheless, exports displaced
by conflict are a loss, as they represent foregone trade, especially in the context of
neighbours who might be expected to trade substantially in peaceful circumstances.
Substituting (3) as a constraint and (2) into (1) allows us to write a Lagrangian function
(L), where λ indicates the Lagrange multiplier:
L = u(cQ − X + M − T ; S) + λ[θ X (S) − M + T ] − C(S) (4)
The function C represents the distortionary (taxation and crowding out) costs of secu-
rity expenditure, which rises with S, so that the partial derivative is positive. This is an
additional cost associated with security spending, absent in Polachek (1997) model.
The first order condition with respect to S is:
us = −λXs + Cs · · · us, Cs > 0, Xs < 0 (5)
In Eq. (5) the marginal utility of security (us) is equated to its marginal costs. The
latter (on the right-hand side of (5)) is comprised of the trade disruption due to con-
flict, and the cost of diverting resources to military and security expenditure. This, last
effect, is absent from the Polachek models. The cost of conflict is not just confined to
displaced trade, but it also has a distortionary resource cost because of security expen-
diture, either because of distortionary taxation or due to the crowding out effect on
other forms of investment, including government spending on health and education;
see Deger and Sen (1990). Note, that security expenditure and benefits derived from
confronting one’s enemy does yield positive utility, but comes at a price. There is,
therefore, an additional cost of belligerent behaviour over and above losses from trade
displacement, and is likely to be substantial because it detracts from poverty reduction
directly.
2.2 Costs of peace
If peace is Pareto optimal, why don’t countries favour it? In this section we model
the costs of peace, which include psychic non-pecuniary costs of making concessions
to one’s adversaries. Additionally, we try to demonstrate how increased globaliza-
tion and democratisation can help to reduce conflict by lowering the cost of making
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concessions to one’s neighbours. To analyse these factors we require a two country
expected utility model of non-cooperative strategic interaction.
The two countries: India and Pakistan are indexed by subscripts I for India and
P for Pakistan. There are two states of nature, denoted by superscripts: one more
peaceful or dovish (D), and the other associated with greater hawkishness (H ). Their
probabilities are defined as π and 1 − π , respectively. The probability of either state
is in turn affected by a actions and efforts; (a) for India and (e) for Pakistan. These
are also the strategic variables employed by the two sides to the conflict. We postulate
that the probability of the peaceful state π rises with the input of action and effort by
the two sides, but at diminishing rates. One can imagine a range of activities by one
or both sides if they wish to promote peace, including a greater willingness to com-
promise, reduce military expenditure, devoting more resources to peaceful economic
development, or a greater willingness to respond to calls for peace by third-parties
such as the UN and the United States.
Actions and efforts to seek peace entail costs for each party. The costs of actions
to promote peace could take a variety of forms, but, above all, there is the loss of
face to either party’s hawkish domestic political constituencies, including the military
establishment. Increased globalization may, however, augment the stock of rhetoric
available to politicians who wish to push their ‘peace’ agenda through the political
process. Secondly, and in a more palpable sense, increased international trade and
the growth it brings may provide the additional resources to buy off domestic ‘war’
lobbies. A more democratic government, following military rule, may similarly use
its mandate from the people to justify greater peace and reduced military expenditure.
The expected utility of India is given by
UI = π(a, e)U DI (E DI + SDI ) + (1 − π)(a, e)U HI (E HI + SHI ) − Z(a(T )) (6)
Where U DI and U HI denote utilities or pay-offs in dovish and hawkish states respec-
tively, weighted by the probabilities of the two states. E DI + SDI , E HI + SHI indicate the
exogenous pair of payoffs from consumption and security expenditure respectively,
in the less belligerent and more belligerent states, respectively. The difference is that
in dovish state security spending is lower and private consumption higher than in the
hawkish state. There will also be more trade between the two countries. Most impor-
tantly, the dovish state of nature will imply greater poverty reduction. Z is the cost
function of undertaking the action, a. Action, a, increases the probability of peace, π ,
however, undertaking it entails a cost, as described above. T indicates greater global-
ization (more trade with the rest of the world), and this is postulated to reduce the cost
of making peace via the cost function (Z ) as discussed above, Za1 <0.3 Also, πa >0,
but πaa <0; there are diminishing returns to these actions. However, both Za > 0 and
Zaa > 0.
Turning to Pakistan, we symmetrically have
UP = π(a, e)U DP (E DP + SDP ) + (1 − π)(a, e)U HI (E HP + SHP ) − L(e(T, P)) (7)
3 Increased globalization is unlikely to directly affect the marginal productivity of actions or efforts (a, e)
that raise the probability of peace (π ).
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L is the cost of effort, e, which increases the probability of peace, π . As with India,
greater globalization lowers the marginal cost of making peaceful concessions, but so
does a hybrid concept called increased democratisation (P) for Pakistan only given
the nature of swings there between democratically elected governments and military
rule; Le1 and Le2 < 0. Also, πe > 0, but πee < 0, Le > 0, and Lee > 0.
In the non-cooperative or Cournot-Nash game played by the two sides both sides
move simultaneously. Each side, therefore, maximises its own utility function with
respect to its own choice variable. For India, it implies maximising utility, Eq. (6),
with respect to a as shown by
πa[U DI (·) − U HI (·)] = Za (8)
Pakistan maximises Eq. (7) with respect to e
πe[U DP (·) − U HP (·)] = Le (9)
Note that in Eqs. (8) and (9) each side will equate its marginal benefit from exercising
their own strategic choice to the corresponding marginal cost. Each side’s strategic
choices will depend on the first order conditions given in Eqs. (8) and (9), along with
a fixed conjecture about the opposition’s strategic choice. These lead to the (linear)
reaction functions for both sides, obtained by totally differentiating Eqs. (8) and (9)
with respect to a and e. For India this is indicated by
de
da/RI
= Zaa + πaa
[
U HI (·) − U DI (·)
]
πae
[
U DI (·) − U HI (·)
]
≥
≤ . . . 0 . . . i f · · ·πae
≥
≤0 (10)
and for Pakistan by
de
da/RP
= πae
[
U DP (·) − U HP (·)
]
Lee + πee
[
U HP (·) − U DP (·)
]
≥
≤ . . . 0 . . . i f . . . πae
≥
≤0 (11)
Note that πae = πea by symmetry.
The reaction functions are positively sloped if πae > 0, implying that the two strat-
egies are complements. This is the standard assumption in the literature on conflict.
In our model, however, we postulate that πae < 0, the choice variables are strategic
substitutes, and the reaction functions slope downwards (Fig. 4). This can only occur
because the strategy space is defined in terms of peace. Thus, if one side behaves
more peacefully it increases the utility of both parties and the other side may free ride
on this action by not bringing about a corresponding increase in their action. This is
particularly relevant in the case of asymmetric bilateral power, as India’s economic
and military power is vastly more than Pakistan’s.
In Fig. 4, two non-cooperative equilibria are illustrated by points N and C , respec-
tively. Point C is more cooperative and peaceful with greater inter-country trade and
poverty reduction. A shift from N to C can occur because of greater globalisation (rise
in T ) because of, say, the establishment of a free trade area, and increased international
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Fig. 4 Reaction functions of India and Pakistan
(not necessarily just bilateral) trade lowers the marginal cost of peaceful behaviour
(Za1, Le1 < 0). Analytically this means a change in the first-order conditions for both
India:
πa[U DI (·) − U HI (·)] = Za1dT (8′)
and, for Pakistan
πe[U DP (·) − U HP (·)] = Le1dT (9′)
This pertains to the economic liberal peace. Alternatively, there could be a rise in the
exogenous pay-offs in terms of consumption expenditure (E) in (8) and (9) above,
leading to the same outcome in Fig. 4.
The costs of peaceful actions may be easier to bear when countries (in this case
only Pakistan) are more democratic, as there may be a mandate from the people to
engage in more poverty reduction, greater social sector spending and lower military
expenditure. This corresponds to the democratic version of the liberal peace, causing
the first order condition for Pakistan to become:
πe[U DP (·) − U HP (·)] = Le2d P (9′′)
This causes Pakistan’s reaction function to shift outwards along India’s, with a new
equilibrium at point S. Note, however, in the new equilibrium (point S) India has
effectively passed on some of the burden of adjustment to Pakistan. In fact, the level
of effort exercised by Pakistan is greater than even in the more cooperative solution
(C), but not India’s. We could argue that India is free riding on Pakistan. In recent
years more international pressure has been exerted on Pakistan to make unilateral
concessions towards India since 2001.
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Hypotheses
H1: Greater bilateral inter-state commerce between the two countries, as well as
greater multilateral trade with third countries lowers various forms of bilat-
eral inter-state conflict. This corresponds to the economic version of the liberal
peace. This hypothesis follows from our theoretical discussion, specifically the
first order conditions in (8′) and (9′), and in inversely from the right-hand side
of (5).
H2: More military spending as a result of increased insecurity raises conflict. The
hegemonic power, however, may have internal conflict (India has many civil
wars) and other neighbours to militarily confront. The marginal utility of secu-
rity spending rises in (5), as well as in (8) and (9).
H3: Development expenditure (such as public spending on education) should lower
conflict, because of economic growth which enables more consumption in
Eqs. (4) to (9). This is also related to the increased democratisation hypoth-
esis, below.
H4: GDP growth will decrease inter-state conflict; there is more to lose from war.
This raises the utility from consumption in (4), (6) through to (9).
H5: Increases in dyadic democracy scores will lead to less conflict, related to the
notion of the democratic version of the liberal peace. Increased democracy may
lower the cost of concessions and compromise with former enemies, as in (9′′)
above.
3.2 Empirical results
There are various data sources on inter-state conflict, see Murshed and Mamoon (2007).
In this paper we report results using the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP) with
the collaboration of the International Peace Research Institute, Oslo (PRIO) and is
collected on an annual basis and covers the full post-World War II period, 1946–
2003, see Harbom et al. (2006). Military expenditures can reflect hostility, as well as
deterrence (Polachek and Seiglie 2006). In the India-Pakistan case, we would like to
examine how each country’s military expenditure/ military burden affects the dispute.
Pakistan’s spending on military expenditure as a proportion of GDP is higher than
India’s. We also look at the proportion of military personnel to the overall population.
This might reflect the extent of militarization in a society. To capture democracy levels
for India and Pakistan, we turn to the Polity IV Project hosted by Center of Interna-
tional Development and Conflict Management (CIDCM). Polity IV computes a com-
bined polity score by subtracting autocracy scores from the democracy scores for the
corresponding year. The value of this Polity score ranges from −10 to 10, where −10
denotes the highest autocracy level, and 10 the maximum democracy score. Although
India always takes a high positive value of 7 or above, Pakistan frequently takes on
negative values. We construct a dyadic variable of democracy for both countries by
combining (multiplying) their Polity scores, following Polachek and Seiglie (2006).
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We add 10 to each countries polity series to make the negative Polity values positive so
that our combined democracy score may capture the variations in the democratization
process only on a positive scale. The dyadic democracy variable shows values as low
as 50 on the scale of 0 to 400 when there are high levels of political dissimilarities
between Pakistan (dictatorship) and India (democracy), and as high as 350 when both
countries are governed by democracies (see Fig. 5). A full data description is presented
in the appendix.
Any simple least square regression analysis may lead to spurious results due to
the endogeneity problems among our variables (from trade, military expenditure and
growth to conflict and vice-versa). We need to utilize a simultaneous equation model
where potential endogeneities between various variables are addressed. In Murshed
and Mamoon (2007), based on our time series data, we ran a Vector Autoregres-
sive model (VAR) which is an extension of univariate autoregressive (AR) models
to capture the evolution and the interdependencies between our multiple time series
(Sims 1980). These results were based on dyadic variables and we found that trade
with the rest of the world was the major factor in reducing India-Pakistan conflict.
In other words, general globalization was most important in lowering India-Pakistan
tensions, compared to bilateral trade. This is not surprising, as these two countries
being quite poor are more likely to trade with the rest of the world compared to each
other. Secondly, a common democratic orientation is secondary to globalization in
mitigating conflict between the two nations (as indicated earlier, this applies mainly
to Pakistan, as India is a steady democracy whereas Pakistan oscillitates between
military rule and elected governments). Thus, we found greater support for the eco-
nomic version of the liberal peace relative to the purely democratic peace. Interestingly
when we ran Granger (1969) causality tests we found reverse causality between con-
flict and bilateral trade, as well as militarization and education expenditure. Thus,
increased trade not only reduces conflict, but conflict also lowers bilateral trade.
A similar argument can be applied to militarization and education expenditure, as
increased threat perceptions also raise military expenditure and lower development
spending.
In this paper we analyze country specific, rather than dyadic, effects in order
to investigate in detail the potential of each country’s trade levels, military burden,
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Fig. 5 Dyadic democracy scores for Pakistan and India
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development expenditure and economic performance in enhancing peace and miti-
gating conflict. For Pakistan, we use Pakistan’s trade share with rest of the world
(Popen), Pakistan’s total exports to GDP ratio (Pexpg) and Pakistan’s imports to GDP
ratio (Pimpg) as proxies for Pakistan’s multilateral trade. Pakistan’s exports to India
(Pxi) are a proxy for bilateral trade. Pakistan’s defence expenditure as a percentage of
its GDP (Pdg) is a proxy for the military burden, and Pedug is Pakistan’s education
expenditure as a percentage of its GDP. Similarly for India, we employ 3 proxies of
multilateral trade namely Iopen, Iexpg and Iimpg, 1 proxy for bilateral trade (Ixp),
1 proxy for military burden (Idg) and 1 proxy for education expenditure (Iedug).
We do not use separate Polity scores for India and Pakistan, as any changes in com-
bined democracy scores are due to Pakistan. Before we carry out our econometric
analysis, we undertook the stationary test. Note that our independent variables are
time series in nature, and thus may have autocorrelation. Achieving stationarity in
such series may be difficult.
We ran unit root tests on the above variables and find that the unit root is only
solved at first differences, as shown by Table 1. Since at levels, nearly all variables
have unit roots, there should be at least one co-integrating relationship for our analysis
to move forward. In other words, we cannot use unrestricted VAR analysis but need to
undertake Vector Error Correction Methodology (VECM) which is only a restricted
VAR, where we first find the presence of the number of co-integration equations in
each VECM specification and then run the regression analysis. VECM also allows
us to have a rich set of information among variables including their short and long-
term adjustment dynamics and thus provides a more comprehensive insight into the
relationship among variables compared to an unrestricted VAR.
The three reduced form VECM equations for Conflict are as follows:
Con f1t = α1(β1,t−i Con ft−i + β2,t−i Ptrt−i + β3,t−i I trt−i + β4,t−i Pdgt−i
+β5,t−i I dgt−i + β6,t−i Demot ) +
6∑
y=1
Cya,t−i + E1t (12)
Con f2t = α2(β7,t−i Con ft−i + β8,t−i Pedut−i + β9,t−i I edut−i + β10,t−i Pdgt−i
+β11,t−i I dgt−i + β12,t−i Demot ) +
6∑
y=1
Cyb,t−i + E2t (13)
Con f3t = α3(β13,t−i Con ft−i + β14,t−i Pgpct−i + β15,t−i I gpct−i + β16,t−i Pdgt−i
+β17,t−i I dgt−i + β18,t−i Demot ) +
6∑
y=1
Cyc,t−i + E3t (14)
Here, βsshow the co-integration relationship for each variable under investigation for
each equation, and the αsshow the adjustment parameters. Cs are the constant terms
for each six variables on the right hand side of each VECM equation, and the E′s are
the respective error terms. As mentioned, the general openness indicator, total export
shares, total import shares and exports to the other country of conflict for both India
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Table 1 Augmented Dickey
Fuller test
*, ** and *** shows significance
at 1, 5 and 10% level
Variables Lag length With intercept With intercept and trend
Fatal 1 −0.875∗ −0.929∗
Popen 1 −0.977∗ −0.984∗
Iopen 1 −1.192∗ −1.495∗
Pexpg 1 −0.937∗ −0.965∗
 Iexpg 1 −0.940∗ −1.257∗
Pimpg 1 −1.125∗ −1.121∗
Iimpg 1 −1.321∗ −1.449
Pxi 1 −1.692∗ −1.702∗
Ixp 1 −1.971∗ −2.328∗
Pedu 1 −0.946 −1.025∗
Iedu 1 −0.841∗ −0.879∗
Pgpc 1 −1.992∗ −1.995∗
Igpc 1 −2.292∗ −2.293∗
Pdg 1 −1.421∗ −1.441∗
Idg 1 −0.899∗ −0.877∗
Pmilpop 1 −1.289∗ −1.292∗
Imilpop 1 −0.756∗ −0.766∗
Demopi 1 −0.982∗ −0.982∗
and Pakistan are utilized as 4 separate single country proxies of trade. Thus there are
4 separate specifications for Eq. (12). Equation (13) employs education and Eq. (14)
employs per capita growth rates to capture development expenditure and level of
economic development for India and Pakistan, respectively while defense and democ-
racy proxies are common regressors for all specifications. Fatal, which is our depen-
dent variable, captures severity of conflict. The total number of VECM specifications
rise to 6.
The results for the VECM equations are presented in Table 2. The lag length for
each VEC equation is (1), based on final prediction error (FPE), Akaike’s information
criterion (AIC), Schwarz’s Bayesian information criterion (SBIC) and the Hannan
and Quinn information criterion (HQIC). There is one co-integrating equation in each
VECM, confirming the robustness of the model specification. Note, that optimal value
of conflict is zero in the long run, meaning that our conflict measure, Fatal takes the
value of 0.
The results for VECM 1 show that Fatal takes a negative value, and Popen
and Iopen positive values. This means that in the short-term both Pakistan and
Indian trade shares are negatively related with Fatal. However, only Indian trade
is significant enough to exert a negative pressure on hostilities in the short-term
adjustment period. In the long run both Pakistan’s and Indian trade shares with
rest of the world will adjust by moving in opposite directions. In the long run
Pakistan would witness a rise in its trade with the outside world and Indian trade
would decline to its steady-state level. The long-term net result on the trade share
of both countries is expected to be positive as trade would be at higher levels with
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peace. The long-term rise in Pakistan’s trade shares in order to adjust to a fall in
hostility levels also mean that the negative effects of India-Pakistan conflict have
thwarted Pakistan’s capacity to trade in international markets more than in India’
case. Results on VECM 2 suggest that in short-term both exports by India and
Pakistan would rise to adjust to any fall in conflict. However, in the long run Pakistani
exports would remain unchanged, whereas Indian exports will adjust downwards. Sim-
ilar short-term adjustment dynamics for imports are observed for India in VECM 3.
However in the long run Pakistan’s imports would rise as conflict moves to its mini-
mally optimal value of 0, whereas imports by India will adjust downwards. The above
discussion suggest that Pakistan’s trading capability has been seriously hampered by
the conflict between both nations despite the fact Pakistan has been historically the
more open economy when compared to India. As far as Indian trade with the outside
world is concerned, in the short-term it is destined to rise further especially if hostili-
ties with Pakistan abate. However, the long run trade share would adjust downwards
unless India follows a more open trade policy and reduces its tariffs to levels similar
to Pakistan.
Bilateral trade would also respond to increased peace as shown by the results of
VECM 4. In the short-term there is a sign of increase in bilateral trade between
India and Pakistan, but the increase is not significant meaning trade between India and
Pakistan would remain low. However, in the long run Indian exports to Pakistan would
decline to reach a steady-state level. Some in Pakistan fear that peace initiatives like
reducing tariffs for Indian goods would mean greater dependency on Indian produce.
Taking into account the historically high hostility levels between two countries, any
peace initiative or confidence building measure which leads to greater market access
for India is viewed with scepticism in Pakistan, as many fear that dependence on India
may expose Pakistan to unnecessary pressures from India, leaving her vulnerable to
one sided solutions to the Kashmir dispute. Our results show that in the long run
the dependency on Indian cheap goods would actually decline, and both countries
would end up being equal trading partners. Thus more bilateral trade, far from cre-
ating any power imbalance between India and Pakistan, would equally distribute the
gains. Pakistan may fulfil its import needs more from other developing countries such
as China. The results for VECM 5 suggest that education expenditure would increase
in the short-term to reduce conflict, and as conflict falls to its optimal level, Pakistan
would be able to simultaneously devote greater resources to its education sector. High
growth rates also adjust positively to decrease hostility levels and in the long run as
the hostilities fall, both countries also witness a strong positive effect on their growth
rates. This means that peace would put India and especially Pakistan on higher growth
paths on a sustainable basis.
In order to further check the conclusions drawn from our VECM results in Table 2,
we generated 6 different forecast schedules from 6 co-integrating VECMs as a simula-
tion exercise to predict how conflict would be affected by changes in its determinants.
Note that the data on Fatal are only up to 2002. Thus the one year forecasts are
generated for Fatal for 2003 period. Figure 6 shows the forecast graphs. Graph 1a,
1b and 1c suggest that if military expenditures in both countries would remain at its
current high levels, along with trade with the outside world at their 2002 levels, a slight
deterioration in democracy scores will have a significant effect on the rise in hostility.
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Graph 1a (VECM 1)
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Graph 1e (VECM 5)
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Fig. 6 Forecasting simulations based on VECMs for fatal
However, if India is able to export or import more, this would at least put a check on
any rise in the severity of conflict and hostilities would adjust to some average level.
Any decline in Indian trade will enhance hostilities. The current low levels of bilateral
trade between Pakistan and India is conflict enhancing, so more trade with increased
exports by both sides to each other should be encouraged. More access to Pakistani
markets on the Indian side may not lead to conflict mitigation if Pakistan is not able to
also export more to India. A rise in education expenditure puts a check on hostilities,
as seen in Graph 1e. Graph 1f is the standard representation of India-Pakistan conflict,
and not only best fits historical trends but also explain the rationale behind recent India-
Pakistan peace initiatives with decreasing hostilities when not only India but Pakistan
also has had economic growth rates as high as 7% per annum. The forecasts suggest
that conflict will rise, even if there is a significant increase in combined democracy
scores, if growth rates plummet. Both Pakistan and India have seen many such years,
when hostilities between both countries rose significantly when at least one of the
countries is performing poorly, but were channeling more resources on the military as
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a proportion of their GDPs. The forecasts favour the economic version over the dem-
ocratic version of the liberal peace. Thus one may look at current peace talks between
both countries with optimism as both are performing well on the economic front and
channeling fewer resources on the military as a proportion of national income, while at
the same time having a divergent set of political institutions, though recently Pakistan
has edged towards greater democracy with elections in February 2008.
A more detailed way to further gauge the dynamics of the relationship between
conflict and trade is through the examination of Impulse Response Function (IRF) and
Forecast Error Variance Decomposition (FEVD). IRFs describe the effect of exoge-
nous impulses on any set of endogenous variables, while FEVDs capture the forecast
error variance for each variable that is attributable to its own innovation and to the
innovation in other endogenous variables. To this purpose, we introduce a more com-
prehensive VECM equation (VECM7) where conflict is explained by multilateral
trade, bilateral trade, economic growth, military expenditure and democracy simulta-
neously in one single equation:
Con f4t = α4(β19,t−i Con ft−i + β20,t−i Ptrt−i,multilateraltrade
+β21,t−i Ptrt−i,bilateraltrade + β22,t−i I trt−i,multiltarealtrade
+β23,t−i I trt−i,bilateraltrade
+β24,t−i Pgpct−i + β25,t−i I gpct−i + β26,t−i Pdgt−i + β27,t−i I dgt−i
+β28,t−i Demot ) +
10∑
y=1
Cyd,t−i + E4t . . . (15)
Table 3 provides the IRF and FEVD results for Eq. 15. A positive shock in overall
global trade levels in Pakistan would lead to a decrease in fatality levels. The conflict
mitigating effect of trade does not subside for long. By contrast, a positive shock in
Indian overall trade raises fatality levels. Any positive shock in Pakistan’ exports to
India would increase the possibility of a further rise in hostilities, but if Pakistan raises
its imports from India that may neutralise such negative shocks. In estimating the
earlier Eqs. 12, 13 and 14, we found that higher exports to India by Pakistan may not
lead to easing of tensions between both neighbours while Indian exports to Pakistan
are more closely related with conflict mitigation between both sides. Recently, both
sides have utilised bilateral trade as a measure to abate hostility. Pakistan in 2006 uni-
laterally opened up its borders to Indian goods as part of the peace strategy initiated
by former Pakistani President Pervez Musharraf.
Better economic performance by Pakistan may abate hostilities between both
nations as any positive shock in Pakistani growth rates cause fatality scores to move
downwards. However, in Indian case this does not seem to be happening since results
show that shocks in Indian growth rate are positively related with Fatal. Similarly,
Pakistani defence expenditure is negatively related with Fatal, and Indian defence
expenditure is positively related to it. A positive shock in Pakistani military expendi-
ture would abate conflict, while a similar shock in Indian military expenditure has an
opposite effect on conflict. The size of IRF coefficients for Idg in comparison to Pdg
suggests that Indian military expenditure is more closely related with conflict, while
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Table 3 IRFs and FEVDs for fatal
VECM 7: Fatal, Popen, Iopen, Pxi, Ixp, Pgpc, Igpc, Pdg, Idg, Demopi
Response variable: fatal
Impulse variables
Period Popen Iopen Pxi Ixp Pgpc
1 −0.0473(0.000) 0.2413(0.000) 0.0130(0.000) 0.0026(0.000) −0.1217(0.000)
2 −0.0644(0.032) 0.3089(0.006) 0.0005(0.017) −0.3191(0.000) −0.1635(0.002)
3 −0.0531(0.036) −0.2347(0.032) 0.0070(0.012) −0.3537(0.002) −0.1155(0.002)
4 −0.0629(0.041) 0.2555(0.033) 0.0035(0.014) −0.0651(0.006) −0.0977(0.003)
5 −0.0511(0.042) 0.2132(0.036) 0.0064(0.012) −0.2043(0.005) −0.0878(0.003)
6 −0.0582(0.043) 0.2380(0.035) 0.0054(0.012) −0.1730(0.006) −0.1280(0.003)
7 −0.0574(0.045) 0.2490(0.036) 0.0047(0.011) −0.2334(0.005) −0.1091(0.003)
8 −0.0571(0.045) 0.2350(0.037) 0.0056(0.010) −0.1861(0.005) −0.1092(0.003)
9 −0.0569(0.046) 0.2381(0.037) 0.0050(0.010) −0.1865(0.005) −0.1074(0.002)
10 −0.0566(0.047) 0.2362(0.037) 0.0055(0.009) −0.1958(0.005) −0.1097(0.002)
Period Igpc Pdg Idg Demopi Fatal
1 0.1654(0.000) 0.2458(0.000) 0.5649(0.000) 0.0012(0.000) 0.4012(1.000)
2 0.1143(0.050) −0.5017(0.034) 1.1441(0.002) −0.0006(0.006) 0.7459(0.864)
3 0.1796(0.047) −0.1098(0.030) 0.7268(0.022) −0.0004(0.007) 0.6468(0.798)
4 0.1014(0.065) −0.1325(0.028) 1.0022(0.020) −0.0002(0.011) 0.6710(0.769)
5 0.1362(0.062) −0.0899(0.025) 0.7309(0.022) 0.0000(0.012) 0.6843(0.773)
6 0.1268(0.064) −0.1573(0.024) 0.8975(0.020) −0.0003(0.012) 0.6304(0.775)
7 0.1361(0.064) −0.1690(0.024) 0.8687(0.020) −0.0002(0.012) 0.6814(0.772)
8 0.1314(0.066) −0.1339(0.023) 0.8580(0.020) −0.0002(0.012) 0.6576(0.770)
9 0.1286(0.067) −0.1404(0.023) 0.8617(0.020) −0.0002(0.013) 0.6666(0.769)
10 0.1318(0.067) −0.1406(0.023) 0.8515(0.020) −0.0002(0.013) 0.6619(0.769)
FEVDs in parentheses
Pakistani military expenditure may represent an element of deterrence. Democracy
is good for peace, but the effect is minimal. An overview of the evolution of shocks
over time for Fatal in Eq. 15 is presented in Fig. 7. We can see that in the short run,
conflict captured by fatality levels has been most sensitive to military expenditures
in India and Pakistan. Any positive shock in Indian or Pakistani military expenditure
would exert upward pressure on fatality levels in the short run, but within the 3rd–4th
year the nature of this effect transforms into a nonlinear relationship between conflict
and military burden, where fatality levels would be rising steeply as an outcome of
a positive shock in Indian military expenditure, while fatalities would witness a drop
when the shock emanates from Pakistan. In the long run however, the shock originat-
ing from the Pakistani side would be absorbed and the fatality levels would adjust to
their original level, while fatality levels would adjust to higher values when the shock
emanates from the Indian side. Table 3 also shows that FEVD is the highest for Fatal
itself, suggesting that current variations in fatality levels are highly dependent on their
previous values.
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Fig. 8 Trade and military dynamics of conflict
Figure 8 shows some more IRFs based on VECM7 plotting reactions of rival par-
ties’ multilateral, bilateral trade and military expenditure when shocks are induced in
these variables for any one country. For example, a positive shock in Indian trade with
the rest of the world would also improve the trading capacity of Pakistan and vice
versa. However, trade levels would settle down at higher levels in case the shock is
induced from Pakistan. If Indian exports to Pakistan rise, Pakistan will also be able to
export more to India while the inverse is not true. If Pakistan is able to export more
to India, the competitiveness of Indian exports to Pakistan decline. A positive shock
in Indian defence expenditure would induce a similar response in Pakistan’s defence
expenditure and vice versa providing further suggesting that Pakistani military expen-
ditures are more reactionary to Indian military postures and represent deterrence than
hostility, unlike in the Indian case.
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4 Conclusions
Conflict between India and Pakistan, which spans over most of last 60 years since their
independence from British rule, has significantly hampered bilateral trade between the
two nations. However, we also find that the converse is also true; more trade between
India and Pakistan (especially Indian exports to Pakistan) decreases conflict and any
measures to improve the bilateral trade share is a considerable confidence building
measure. A regional trade agreement along the lines of a South Asian Free Trade
Agreement (SAFTA) has much potential for the improvement of relations between
India and Pakistan on a long-term basis. Pakistan and India’s general degree of open-
ness to world trade is, however, the dominant economic factor in conflict resolution,
as argued by Dorussen and Ward (2010).
We find some evidence that India’s military expenditure is conflict enhancing,
whereas Pakistan’s is more reactive. In an ideal world increased dyadic democracy
between pairs of nation should reduce inter-state hostility according to the democratic
liberal peace hypothesis; this relationship in our case is present but weak. Peace ini-
tiatives, it should be remembered, are not the sole prerogative of democracies; they
can also be made by countries which are less than perfectly democratic out of eco-
nomic self-interest. Pakistan, at present, is making unilateral concessions on many
disputed issues with India. Our findings, however, veer towards the economic variant
of the liberal peace hypothesis. Economic progress (especially in Pakistan) and pov-
erty reduction combined with greater openness to international trade in general are
more significant drivers of peace between nations like India and Pakistan, rather than
the independent contribution of a common democratic polity. Despite a relatively high
democracy score in Pakistan up to 1999, conflict between the countries escalated in
the 1990s. So it is more economic interdependence rather than politics which is likely
to contribute towards peaceful relations between India and Pakistan in the near future.
In many ways, our results for an individual dyad echo Polachek (1997) work across
several dyads, where it is argued that democracies cooperate not because they have
common political systems, but because their economies are intricately and intensively
interdependent. As pointed by Hegre (2000), it is at these higher stages of economic
development that the contribution of common democratic values to peace becomes
more salient. Meaningful democracy cannot truly function where acute poverty is
endemic, even in ostensible democracies such as India. In the final analysis, it may be
that democracy itself is an endogenous by-product of increased general prosperity, as
suggested nearly half a century ago by Lipset (1960). Only then, will nations be able
to fully appreciate Angell-Lane (1910) arguments regarding the futility of conflict.
Appendix: data and sources
Demopi: Pakistan and India’s combine democracy score (by adding 10 to India and
Pakistan’s Polity2 values for each year and then taking the product of these
values in order to covert the variable in dyadic form), Years; 1950–2003
Fatal: Annual fatality level of conflict between Pakistan and India, scores from 0
to 6
123
The conflict mitigating effects of trade 165
0 None
1 1–25 Deaths
2 26–100 Deaths
3 101–250 Deaths
4 251–500 Deaths
5 501–999 Deaths
6>999 Deaths
Years: 1950–2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02, Faten
et al. (2004)
Idg: India’s Defence Expenditure as a percentage India’s GDP at current market
prices, Years: 1950-2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set version 3.02,
World Development Indicators (2006) (World Bank), Government Finance
Statistics Year Book 2006 (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan
Iedug: India’s education expenditure as a %age of India’s GDP at current market
prices, Years: 1950–2005, Sources: Indian Economic Survey, Education
Statistics (Department of Education, India) and Education Statistics 2006
(World Bank)
Iexpg: India’s total exports as a percentage of India’s GDP, Years: 1950-2005,
Source: Indian Economic Survey, International Financial Statistics (2006)
(IMF)
Ig: Annual growth rate of India’s per capita gross domestic product (GDP) at
constant prices, Years: 1950–2005, Source: Indian Economic Survey
Igpc: India’s real per capita growth rate: Years: 1950–2005, Source: Indian
Economic Survey, International Financial Statistics (2006)(IMF), World
Development Indicators (2006) (World Bank)
Iimpg: India’s total imports as a percentage of India’s GDP, Years: 1950–2005,
Source: Indian Economic Survey, International Financial Statistics (2006)
(IMF)
Imilopop: India’s number of military personnel as a percentage of Indi’s total popula-
tion. Years: 1950–2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version 3.02,
Faten et al. (2004); International Financial Statistics (2006) (IMF)
Iopen: India’s exports plus imports as a %age India’s GDP at current market prices,
Years: 1950–2005, Source: International Financial Statistics (2006) (IMF)
Ixp: Indian exports to Pakistan, Years: 1960–2005, Source: as above.
P2i: Polity 2 Score for India, numeric range from −10 (high autocracy) to 10
(high democracy), Years: 1950–2003, Source: Polity IV Project(Center for
International Development and Conflict Management)
P2p: Polity 2 Score for Pakistan, numeric range from −10 (high autocracy) to
10 (high democracy), Years: 1950–2003, Source: as above.
Pedug: Pakistan’s education expenditure as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP at cur-
rent market prices, Years: 1950–2005, Sources: Pakistan Economic Survey
and Education Statistics 2006 (World Bank)
Pexpg: Pakistan’s exports as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP, Years: 1950–2005,
Source: International Financial Statistics 2006 (IMF)
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Pdg: Pakistan’s Defence Expenditure as a percentage Pakistan’s GDP at cur-
rent market prices, Years: 1950–2005, Sources: Correlates of war data set
version 3.02, World Development Indicators (2006), Government Finance
Statistics Year Book 2006 (IMF) and Economic Survey of Pakistan
Pg: Annual growth rate of Pakistan’s GDP per capita at constant prices, Years:
1950–2005, Source: Pakistan Economic Survey
Pgpc: Pakistan’s real GDP per capita Growth rates, Years: 1950–2005, Source:
International Financial Statistics (2006) (IMF), Pakistan Economic Survey
Pimpg: Pakistan’s imports as a percentage of Pakistan’s GDP, Years: 1950–2005,
Source: International Financial Statistics (2006) (IMF)
Pmilpop: Pakistan’s number of military personnel as a percentage of Pakistan’s total
population. Years: 1950–2003, Source: COW Inter-State War Data, Version
3.02, Faten et al. (2004); International Financial Statistics (2006) (IMF)
Popen: Pakistan’s exports plus imports as a percentage Pakistan’s gross domestic
product at current prices, Years: 1950–2005, Source: International Finan-
cial Statistics (2006) (IMF)
Pxi: Pakistan’s exports to India, Years: 1960–2005, Source: Direction of Trade
Statistics yearbook, IMF
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